I enjoyed reading this description of the legal/transition justice choices faced by new democracies. The literature review is detailed and articulates nicely the various hypothesis that will be tested. I have little to contribute on the causal mechanisms (which are already well defined!). My only suggestion concerns your definition of terms. In the interest of lay readers like myself, can I suggest you define precisely what you mean by 'transitional justice' (and when transitional justice is not selected what are the alternatives?). It looks like you already have this placemarked - but would also be helpful if you could describe in more detail 'truth commissions' and 'courtroom trial' options - outlining the pros and cons of each and possible permutations and examples?
I'm quite surprised that several other issues didn't appear in your theoretical section. First, one might consider the role of the secret police and the intensity of repression in the previous regime. It is not uncommon in the Eastern European cases that major politicians on both the left and the right (although more often the former) get implicated when secret police files get opened and their collaboration is revealed (in some cases it is falsified). Even if there is no prosecution, it can destroy electoral chances (and does). Extent of complicity might make it harder for lustration to occur to the extent that one needs a threshold for prosecution and one never knows what investigators will turn up that might implicate those who needed to collaborate. There have also been instances of high level CP officials threatening to provide evidence on highly placed politicians, as well. I'm not familiar with the Political Terror Index or with Cingranelli-Richards, so maybe they capture this dynamic. I think that the dynamics I discuss above have a very different mechanism than stories about the level or length of abuse.
Secondly, I'm also surprised that you don't account for the ease with which bureaucrats and politicians can be recruited to replace those banned from politics/prosecuted. After WWII US plans for lustration in Germany and Japan were drastically cut back once it became clear that trials would decimate the experienced, competent political class and leave few to run the polity. This is one reason that Eastern European bureaucracies tended to not get cleaned out. Related to this is the power of complicituous politicians. Fujimori, for example, escaped prosecution for a long time because of his supporters' clout. Likewise, in Eastern Europe, the new socialist parties were often lead by formerly high ranking CP officials but were sufficiently popular to hobble lustration. I don't know if this will be captured in your leadership indices, as lustration can be hampered by the opposition pretty easily. Perhaps a measure of vote share of any authoritarian successor parties?
Great topic. As I mentioned to you earlier, I think it would be interesting to add a "learning" hypothesis that goes beyond region. Are those in charge of making decisions about transitional justice influenced by successes in other countries? If this isn't completely captured in your "region" hypotheses (such as learning in African cases from Latin American cases), I think it would be interesting to add.
Hi Amy: I think your topic is very interesting, and I am curious to see what your results are. A couple of quick notes. I think you have a lot of hypotheses, and they are somewhat difficult for the reader to track. Since you're looking at factors contributing to the adoption of any transitional justice mechanism, as well as the propensity for a certain type of mechanism, maybe you can separate out into two sets of hypotheses, one for each of these dependent variables? Then you could maybe combine into a smaller number of hypotheses (e.g. transitional justice more likely in X, Y and Z) that would help the reader get a picture of what types of contexts are more or less conducive to transitional justice, and the particular justice mechanisms. Also, you may consider a chart that describes your hypotheses and expected (and actual) effects. Perhaps I am a more visual learner, but that would definitely help me!
I enjoyed reading this description of the legal/transition justice choices faced by new democracies. The literature review is detailed and articulates nicely the various hypothesis that will be tested. I have little to contribute on the causal mechanisms (which are already well defined!). My only suggestion concerns your definition of terms. In the interest of lay readers like myself, can I suggest you define precisely what you mean by 'transitional justice' (and when transitional justice is not selected what are the alternatives?). It looks like you already have this placemarked - but would also be helpful if you could describe in more detail 'truth commissions' and 'courtroom trial' options - outlining the pros and cons of each and possible permutations and examples?
ReplyDeleteI'm quite surprised that several other issues didn't appear in your theoretical section. First, one might consider the role of the secret police and the intensity of repression in the previous regime. It is not uncommon in the Eastern European cases that major politicians on both the left and the right (although more often the former) get implicated when secret police files get opened and their collaboration is revealed (in some cases it is falsified). Even if there is no prosecution, it can destroy electoral chances (and does). Extent of complicity might make it harder for lustration to occur to the extent that one needs a threshold for prosecution and one never knows what investigators will turn up that might implicate those who needed to collaborate. There have also been instances of high level CP officials threatening to provide evidence on highly placed politicians, as well. I'm not familiar with the Political Terror Index or with Cingranelli-Richards, so maybe they capture this dynamic. I think that the dynamics I discuss above have a very different mechanism than stories about the level or length of abuse.
ReplyDeleteSecondly, I'm also surprised that you don't account for the ease with which bureaucrats and politicians can be recruited to replace those banned from politics/prosecuted. After WWII US plans for lustration in Germany and Japan were drastically cut back once it became clear that trials would decimate the experienced, competent political class and leave few to run the polity. This is one reason that Eastern European bureaucracies tended to not get cleaned out. Related to this is the power of complicituous politicians. Fujimori, for example, escaped prosecution for a long time because of his supporters' clout. Likewise, in Eastern Europe, the new socialist parties were often lead by formerly high ranking CP officials but were sufficiently popular to hobble lustration. I don't know if this will be captured in your leadership indices, as lustration can be hampered by the opposition pretty easily. Perhaps a measure of vote share of any authoritarian successor parties?
Great topic. As I mentioned to you earlier, I think it would be interesting to add a "learning" hypothesis that goes beyond region. Are those in charge of making decisions about transitional justice influenced by successes in other countries? If this isn't completely captured in your "region" hypotheses (such as learning in African cases from Latin American cases), I think it would be interesting to add.
ReplyDeleteHi Amy: I think your topic is very interesting, and I am curious to see what your results are. A couple of quick notes. I think you have a lot of hypotheses, and they are somewhat difficult for the reader to track. Since you're looking at factors contributing to the adoption of any transitional justice mechanism, as well as the propensity for a certain type of mechanism, maybe you can separate out into two sets of hypotheses, one for each of these dependent variables? Then you could maybe combine into a smaller number of hypotheses (e.g. transitional justice more likely in X, Y and Z) that would help the reader get a picture of what types of contexts are more or less conducive to transitional justice, and the particular justice mechanisms. Also, you may consider a chart that describes your hypotheses and expected (and actual) effects. Perhaps I am a more visual learner, but that would definitely help me!
ReplyDelete