Quick style note: you should note on Figure 1 that the game tree should be mirrored on both sides (at least this is how I understand the game). Not doing so is confusing, although I realize it is hard to fit a complicated Bayesian signaling game tree into a small space.
I find your discussion of the tradeoffs on pp.13-14 to be very insightful. Its good to see someone trying to wrestle with how particular complexes of IV's are valued/viewed instead of making blanket statements.
There is a lot on your analytical plate, but there were two things that I would suggest. First, you might want to consider the ability of states to credibly commit to honoring agreements in the absence of an IO who can lessen the transparency/enforcement costs. This might explain why powerful states (especially lower riparian ones) agree to IO's. This is especially true if you believe that exercises of power are costly (especially military) internationally (in terms of reputation loss) or domestically, which might constrain powerful states from fully flexing their muscles. I believe you got a comment to this effect at Mini-APSA, but I second it. States might need IO's to resolve commitment issues. Second, this commitment view also suggests that states may consider each other's ability to enforce agreements on their own citizens as a potential factor in calling for IO's (or in assessing bargaining power).
Both of these issues would dilute your focus on information asymmetries somewhat, but I think it would enrich your explanatory hypotheses sufficiently to justify the added complexity so long as you don't intend to solve out a formal model (then the extra weight may overly complicate analysis).
Quick style note: you should note on Figure 1 that the game tree should be mirrored on both sides (at least this is how I understand the game). Not doing so is confusing, although I realize it is hard to fit a complicated Bayesian signaling game tree into a small space.
ReplyDeleteI find your discussion of the tradeoffs on pp.13-14 to be very insightful. Its good to see someone trying to wrestle with how particular complexes of IV's are valued/viewed instead of making blanket statements.
There is a lot on your analytical plate, but there were two things that I would suggest. First, you might want to consider the ability of states to credibly commit to honoring agreements in the absence of an IO who can lessen the transparency/enforcement costs. This might explain why powerful states (especially lower riparian ones) agree to IO's. This is especially true if you believe that exercises of power are costly (especially military) internationally (in terms of reputation loss) or domestically, which might constrain powerful states from fully flexing their muscles. I believe you got a comment to this effect at Mini-APSA, but I second it. States might need IO's to resolve commitment issues. Second, this commitment view also suggests that states may consider each other's ability to enforce agreements on their own citizens as a potential factor in calling for IO's (or in assessing bargaining power).
Both of these issues would dilute your focus on information asymmetries somewhat, but I think it would enrich your explanatory hypotheses sufficiently to justify the added complexity so long as you don't intend to solve out a formal model (then the extra weight may overly complicate analysis).