This is a clever analysis of the role of institutional features in determining levels of repression in dictatorial regimes and think it makes an interesting contribution to the literature. It builds well on some of readings that we discussed in class, and think it might be useful to draw in some of these analysis. Specifically, would refer you to Wintobe 1990 who show how different tinpot and totalitarian regime types employ varying levels of repression. Also Gandhi and Przeworski 2006 who examine ways in which different institutional forms of dictatorships seek cooperation.
A second observation concerns the way you frame the tradeoff between repression and accomodation as a way dictators deal with opposition. I wonder if there should be a third alternative, similar to 'accomodation' but different in that involves rent sharing - i.e. a tranfer of assets but not necessarily political power?
I will have more suggestions for you in class. The first thing I would suggest, though, is to have a look at the literature on totalitarian regimes and Stalinism, as they have a lot to say about the unique mode of repression in these states. You should also look at some of the work done around the Chinese's decision to repress at Tienanmen. Here are a few works to get you started:
Thompson, Mark (2001). "To Shoot or not to Shoot". Comparative politics 34:1.
Brzezinski, Zbigniew (1956). The Permanent Purge.
You can also check out the classic: Arendt, Hannah. The origins of Totalitarianism
Secondly, I think you need to define your variables much more concretely. I'm really unclear what is and is not encompassed in capacity.
I think that your capacity variable is going to be hard to measure outside of making some basic assumptions that particular regime types have comparative advantages in repression (as noted in the literature above). This is fine, but it misses out on the fact that sometimes accomodation is much cheaper and vastly preferable (see also Ghandi and Przeworksi (2006), “Cooperation, Cooptation, and Rebellion Under Dictatorships". Economics and Politics, 18:1). In addition, the assumption that repression is preferable ex ante in some regimes is a bit of circular argument and overlooks the fact that it is costly and that a lot of times it is simply easier to rule through the use of a legitimating technique or by depoliticizing the populace (as many argue occurred in Communist Europe. See also Lisa Wedeen (1999), Ambiguities of Domination: Politics, Rhetoric, and Symbols in Contemporary Syria).
One thing that concerns me is that your regime type variables are covering both the ability to repress and preferences for it. I think this is a rather strong assumption to make given heterogeneity even within categories. It is also unclear that your predictions track with the current literature. For instance, a lot of Stepan's work on military regimes indicates that the Latin American ones were much less brutal than other sorts of regimes, since they were much more likely to fracture and had an institutional interest in not doing so. Moreover, they typically ruled for short periods of time and often wanted to leave politics ASAP (or had significant groupings that did). I would read more of the early literature on these subjects and think through your claims. Is there a way to test them? Otherwise, it is difficult to know if your proxy variables are doing what they are supposed to be.
Finally, you should bear in mind that not all dictators actually have the capacity to repress in the first place. In addition to constraints based on legitimacy, there is the very real problem that the military might not obey orders to fire or that the state is weak (as is the case in much of Africa) or fractured. As such, you might want to include a rough control for this by trying to get total state revenue figures or (better) military budgets. Civil War, which you included, might address this concern somewhat.
This is a clever analysis of the role of institutional features in determining levels of repression in dictatorial regimes and think it makes an interesting contribution to the literature. It builds well on some of readings that we discussed in class, and think it might be useful to draw in some of these analysis. Specifically, would refer you to Wintobe 1990 who show how different tinpot and totalitarian regime types employ varying levels of repression. Also Gandhi and Przeworski 2006 who examine ways in which different institutional forms of dictatorships seek cooperation.
ReplyDeleteA second observation concerns the way you frame the tradeoff between repression and accomodation as a way dictators deal with opposition. I wonder if there should be a third alternative, similar to 'accomodation' but different in that involves rent sharing - i.e. a tranfer of assets but not necessarily political power?
I will have more suggestions for you in class. The first thing I would suggest, though, is to have a look at the literature on totalitarian regimes and Stalinism, as they have a lot to say about the unique mode of repression in these states. You should also look at some of the work done around the Chinese's decision to repress at Tienanmen. Here are a few works to get you started:
ReplyDeleteThompson, Mark (2001). "To Shoot or not to Shoot". Comparative politics 34:1.
Brzezinski, Zbigniew (1956). The Permanent Purge.
You can also check out the classic: Arendt, Hannah. The origins of Totalitarianism
Secondly, I think you need to define your variables much more concretely. I'm really unclear what is and is not encompassed in capacity.
I think that your capacity variable is going to be hard to measure outside of making some basic assumptions that particular regime types have comparative advantages in repression (as noted in the literature above). This is fine, but it misses out on the fact that sometimes accomodation is much cheaper and vastly preferable (see also Ghandi and Przeworksi (2006), “Cooperation, Cooptation, and Rebellion Under
Dictatorships". Economics and Politics, 18:1). In addition, the assumption that repression is preferable ex ante in some regimes is a bit of circular argument and overlooks the fact that it is costly and that a lot of times it is simply easier to rule through the use of a legitimating technique or by depoliticizing the populace (as many argue occurred in Communist Europe. See also Lisa Wedeen (1999), Ambiguities of Domination: Politics, Rhetoric, and Symbols in Contemporary Syria).
One thing that concerns me is that your regime type variables are covering both the ability to repress and preferences for it. I think this is a rather strong assumption to make given heterogeneity even within categories. It is also unclear that your predictions track with the current literature. For instance, a lot of Stepan's work on military regimes indicates that the Latin American ones were much less brutal than other sorts of regimes, since they were much more likely to fracture and had an institutional interest in not doing so. Moreover, they typically ruled for short periods of time and often wanted to leave politics ASAP (or had significant groupings that did). I would read more of the early literature on these subjects and think through your claims. Is there a way to test them? Otherwise, it is difficult to know if your proxy variables are doing what they are supposed to be.
Finally, you should bear in mind that not all dictators actually have the capacity to repress in the first place. In addition to constraints based on legitimacy, there is the very real problem that the military might not obey orders to fire or that the state is weak (as is the case in much of Africa) or fractured. As such, you might want to include a rough control for this by trying to get total state revenue figures or (better) military budgets. Civil War, which you included, might address this concern somewhat.