1. The strength of a rebel group is defined by their ability to govern regarding providing social services and the level of institutionalization. Strong rebel groups are states in everything but name. As suggested by the author, the rebel group can be the state breaker and state maker. The strength of the rebel is defined by its similarity with the prototype of state institutions. I think it will be helpful to identify the distinct features of the rebel groups regarding its relations with the state. 2. Regarding civilian acceptance of the rebel institutions, except coercion and economic performance, I think political incentives should also be included since the majority of rebel groups have political/ideological appeals (which are already included in the author’s model), of which the civilians are the audience.
The explanatory variables seem "catch all" categories (nothing is left out), I would stick to higher order ones (geography, taxation) and defend the thesis that these are more important than others. Also, are there other explanations out there for the emergence of institutions in civil wars you argue against? Finally, I would include a discussion of informality here, these seem key in the context of your topic: states that do everything states do, but which the international community gives them the name of rebel groups
Great paper -- I think you lay out the basis for a rich piece of theory and theory-testing with great clarity and structure. A few thoughts (some of which we discussed):
In terms of independent variables, you mention 'strong territorial control'. While this is a near-necessary condition for many of the institutions you include as dep. variables, it is likely to be established by groups for some of the same reasons as institutions themselves-- i.e., in order to extract resources, in order to look like a state and establish state-like functions, etc. So there is some question as to its being a causal variable in the pure sense.
For both rebels, a couple of additional motivations may exist: (1) establishment of legitimacy in the eyes of international and transnational actors, including diaspora from whom remissions are desired (in this sense, diaspora revenue should be theorized differently from other types of outside revenue); (2) desire to protect and relate to the population they claim to represent (esp. in separatist/ethnically-oriented rebellions).
Strong paper, with lots of interesting possibilities for future research.
1. The strength of a rebel group is defined by their ability to govern regarding providing social services and the level of institutionalization. Strong rebel groups are states in everything but name. As suggested by the author, the rebel group can be the state breaker and state maker. The strength of the rebel is defined by its similarity with the prototype of state institutions. I think it will be helpful to identify the distinct features of the rebel groups regarding its relations with the state.
ReplyDelete2. Regarding civilian acceptance of the rebel institutions, except coercion and economic performance, I think political incentives should also be included since the majority of rebel groups have political/ideological appeals (which are already included in the author’s model), of which the civilians are the audience.
Theory building paper, very nice!
ReplyDeleteThe explanatory variables seem "catch all" categories (nothing is left out), I would stick to higher order ones (geography, taxation) and defend the thesis that these are more important than others.
Also, are there other explanations out there for the emergence of institutions in civil wars you argue against?
Finally, I would include a discussion of informality here, these seem key in the context of your topic: states that do everything states do, but which the international community gives them the name of rebel groups
Great paper -- I think you lay out the basis for a rich piece of theory and theory-testing with great clarity and structure. A few thoughts (some of which we discussed):
ReplyDeleteIn terms of independent variables, you mention 'strong territorial control'. While this is a near-necessary condition for many of the institutions you include as dep. variables, it is likely to be established by groups for some of the same reasons as institutions themselves-- i.e., in order to extract resources, in order to look like a state and establish state-like functions, etc. So there is some question as to its being a causal variable in the pure sense.
For both rebels, a couple of additional motivations may exist: (1) establishment of legitimacy in the eyes of international and transnational actors, including diaspora from whom remissions are desired (in this sense, diaspora revenue should be theorized differently from other types of outside revenue); (2) desire to protect and relate to the population they claim to represent (esp. in separatist/ethnically-oriented rebellions).
Strong paper, with lots of interesting possibilities for future research.